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THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
The term "Administrative Law" has no authoritative definition
in English. In the third revision of Bouvier's Law Dictionary
by Francis Rawle, published in 1914, the term does not appear.
The first book on the subject in this country, if not in English,
appeared in 1893. This was Professor Goodnow's "Compara-
tive Administrative Law." In that book he says: "Of late
years, with the great awakening on the continent of Europe of
interest in administrative subjects, the term administrative law-
in reality a simple translation of a French expression-has grad-
ually crept into our legal vocabulary, and at the present time has
obtained recognition from some of the most advanced legal
thinkers. The use of the term may therefore be regarded as
perfectly proper; though that use must be accompanied by an
explanation." His definition of Administrative Law is as fol-
lows: "Administrative Law is therefore that part of the public
law which fixes the organization and determines the competence
of the administrative authorities, and indicates to the individual
remedies for the violation of his rights." In i9o5, in his book on
"The Principles of the Administrative Law of the United States,"
Professor Goodnow again defines Administrative Law as follows:
"Administrative Law is therefore that part of the law which fixes
the organization and determines the competence of the authorities
which execute the law, and indicates to the individual remedies
for the violation of his rights." On the other hand, in 1911, in
the introduction to his Cases on Administrative Law, Professor
Freund says: "The term 'administrative law' is sometimes applied
to all provisions of law regulating matters of public administra-
tion, -such as civil service, elections, municipal government,
schools, public revenue, or highways. In so far as such legisla-
tion involves problems of public policy and of administrative effi-
ciency, it concerns the student of political science and of public
administration. The chief concern of administrative law, on the
other hand, as of all other branches of civil law, is the protection
of private rights, and its subject-matter is therefore the nature
and the mode of exercise of administrative power and the system
of relief against administrative action. This limitation of the
subject seems conformable to the prevailing usage and under-
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standing in this country, while on the continent of Europe all
positive statutory law is treated as belonging to the province of
administrative law." Professor Freund's definition is narrower
than Professor Goodnow's, and brings the subject within the
scope of a purely legal treatise. It will therefore be accepted as
defining the scope of this article.
For American lawyers, however, the term "administrative
power" itself needs definition. Our constitutions, state and
national, follow almost universally Montesquieu's division of the
powers of government. The theory of the separation of such
powers into the legislative, the executive, and the judicial, con-
trolled our political philosophy at the time our Federal Constitu-
tion was adopted. The language of that theory is still used, but
the very courts which assert the doctrine of the separation of
powers, use in addition to the terms "legislative," "executive"
and "judicial" power, the term, "administrative" power.
Obviously if the terms "legislative," "executive" and "judicial"
are sufficient to describe all the powers of the government, there
is no room for any such power as the administrative power. Con-
fusion here arises from the fact that the terms "legislative,"
"executive" and "judicial" are used with two distinct meanings;
one historical, the other functional. Historically all the powers of
government have been exercised by officers who are called execu-
tive, legislative or judicial, but there has never been any logical
division of the functions of government among the officers exer-
cising those functions. From the standpoint of the function
which they perform, there are four kinds of officers, and not
three, and the administrative function supplements the executive,
legislative and judicial functions.
The British constitution, being unwritten and subject to change
at any time by act of Parliament, has never been especially con-
cerned with the logical division of the powers of government.
The restraint of the arbitrary power of the King, the control of
taxation by Parliament, the independence of the judiciary, and
the responsibility of public officers to the law, are the principal
features upon which the English have laid emphasis in the devel-
opment of their constitution. In the United States, however, the
legislative powers granted by the Constitution are vested in Con-
gress; the executive in the President; and the judicial power in
one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish. It was said by Chief
Justice Marshall in Wayman v. Southard, io Wheaton I, *46,
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that "the difference between the departments undoubtedly is, that
the legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary
construes the law." If, then, the entire action of the sovereign
were merely the making, the execution and the construction of
law, the separation of powers would give no trouble. The func-
tions of the state, however, include many other matters than the
mere making and enforcing of laws. The term "law" of course,
has two meanings. It may be used to denote an act of the legis-
lative body regardless of the character of that act, or it may be
used in its stricter sense of a rule established or enforced by the
sovereign. In the former sense an act appropriating money for
a specific object is a law. In the strict sense such an act is an
administrative act. Whether or not a particular administrative
act can be performed by one or the other departments of govern-
ment, is a question of constitutional law depending upon the
constitution of the particular sovereignty, state or federal. The
essential thing to bear in mind is that the nature of the act is
not affected in any way by the constitutional provision which
determines by what department of the government that act must
or can be performed. No case better illustrates the character o
the constitutional controversy than Norwalk Street Railway Com-
pany's Appeal, 65 Conn. 576. The court in that case held that
the power of regulating the location, construction and operation
of street railways given to the local municipal authorities by a
Connecticut statute, clearly falls without the limits of the judicial
department, and that the exercise of such a power cannot become
a judicial function merely because another statute gives the rail-
way company the right of appeal to the superior court or any
judge thereof when the municipal authorities fail to exercise their
powers within the limited time. The function to be exercised
in that case was clearly administrative. The dissenting opinion
by Judge Baldwin took the ground that the appeal might be con-
strued to be a judicial proceeding, because the judge was bound
to dispose of it in accordance with the fundamental rules of law.
The difficulty in this reasoning is that there are no fundamental
rules of law as to where a street railway track ought to go.
The determination of what is the best location for that track in
the interests of the community calls for the exercise of an admin-
istrative, and not for a judicial discretion. Judge Baldwin fur-
ther maintains that even if the power be administrative, it can
be constitutionally conferred on a judge of the superior court.
This latter point involves simply a question of the construction
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of the particular state constitution, and that construction is largely
a matter of historical consideration rather than of legal reasoning.
In the case of Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S.
21o, the following principles were laid down by the United States
Supreme Court:
"So far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, a state
may, by constitutional provision, unite legislative and
judicial powers in the same body.
A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces
liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under
existing laws, while legislation looks to the future and
changes conditions, making new rules to be thereafter
applied.
The making of a rate by a legislative body after hearing
the interested parties, is not res judicata upon the validity
of the rate when questioned by those parties in a suit in a
court. Litigation does not arise until after legislation; nor
can a state make such legislative action res judicata in
subsequent litigation.
Proceedings legislative in nature are not proceedings in
a court within the meaning of Rev. Stat. § 720, no matter
what may be the character of the body in which they take
place.
Whether a railroad rate is confiscatory so as to deprive
the company of its property without due process of law
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment depends
upon the valuation of the property, the income derivable
from the rate, and the proportion between the two, which
are matters of fact which the company cannot be prevented
from trying before a competent tribunal of its own
choosing."
In this case the Court was considering the provisions of the
Virginia constitution which united legislative and judicial powers
in a Virginia state corporation commission. With this case should
be compared a case involving the Michigan constitution, Detroit
and Mackinac Railway Co. v. Michigan Railroad Commission,
235 U. S. 402, where the following principles were laid down by
the Supreme Court of the United States:
"As the constitution of Michigan separates legislative,
executive and judicial powers and plainly forbids giving
the judicial department legislative powers, this court will
not, in the absence of a decision to that effect by the state
court, believe that the legislature, in establishing a railroad
commission and granting power of review to the courts,
intended to clothe them with power to act in a legislative
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capacity. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S.
21o, distinguished.
Under the Michigan Railroad Commission Act, as con-
strued in the light of the provisions of the constitution of
that state, the function of the supreme court of the state in
reviewing an order of the Commission fixing rates is judi-
cial and not legislative; and its final order or decree
sustaining a rate established by the Commission as not con-
fiscatory is res judicata and can be so pleaded in another
action in the federal court to prevent the Commission from
enforcing such rates.
Where the state court, in construing a statute of the
state, has held that the establishment of rules regulating
public utility corporations is a legislative function, this
court, in the absence of a clear decision of the state court
to the contrary, assumes that the same principle applies
also to rates."
It may be worth while to give a number of instances of admin-
istrative functions, and to point out how those functions have
actually been distributed among the departments of government
in different jurisdictions.
i. Appropriations: In general, appropriations are made by
the legislature. In some states certain limited powers of appro-
priation are given to a board of state officers when the legislature
is not in session. Because the administrative power of appro-
priation is exercised by the legislature, the legislature has assumed
to regulate the administration by making appropriations in minute
detail.' There is no question that efficiency in administration
requires that the expenditure in detail of appropriations should be
left to the administrative officials, subject to a strict accounting to
the legislature.
2. Licenses: The issue of licenses is an administrative mat-
ter, pure and simple. In some cases the act of the administrative
officer when issuing the license, is purely ministerial, as in the
case of the approval by the secretary of state of a certificate of
incorporation which complies with the terms of a general corpor-
ation act. In other cases an administrative discretion is to be
exercised. This is generally the case in granting licenses for the
sale of liquor. In Pennsylvania, however, and perhaps in other
jurisdictions the administration of the liquor license law is left to
the courts.
3. The Regulation of Railway Rates: This is purely an
administrative matter. This power may be exercised by the
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legislature directly, or it may be delegated to a commission, or it
may be left to railway managers.1
4. The Appointment of Public Officers: Nothing is more
essentially administrative than the personal appointment of a pub-
lic officer. This administrative function is exercised in the great-
est possible variety of ways. In the case of a large number of
offices, the appointment is made directly by the people by ballot.
In some cases the appointment is made by the legislature. In
some cases the appointment is by the chief executive, subject to
confirmation by an executive council consisting of the legislature
as a whole; or of one house of the legislature, as in the case of
presidential nominations, which are confirmed by the senate; or
of an independent body. Some appointments are made by judges;
in some states clerks and bailiffs; in some states prosecuting
attorneys and police boards. The fact that the appointment is
made by the legislative or judicial department, does not, of course,
alter the administrative character of the function of appointment.
In some cases the appointment is left to the chief or subordinate
executive officer, but his discretion is limited by the legislature
through civil service acts.
As already stated, whether or not a particular administrative
function can be exercised by one department of the government
or another, is a question of local constitutional law, the decision
of which is governed by local historical considerations. How,
then, does the administrative function differ from the executive
and legislative and the judicial functions of the government? As
between the judicial and the administrative function the distinc-
tion is clear. A judicial act necessarily involves the determination
by the court of the respective rights of two or more parties whose
rights are subject to the jurisdiction of the court and who are
given a reasonable opportunity to appear before that court and
to be heard by it from the evidence which they produce. The
proceeding may be in rem, as in admiralty, in which case the seiz-
ure of the res gives the jurisdiction; or it may be quasi in rem,
as in foreclosure cases, where the res is within the jurisdiction of
the court, and notice is given to the owners of that res; or it may
be in personam, where the defendant himself is within the juris-
diction of the court. Generally speaking, it is part of the judicial
function not simply to hear the parties, but to compel the attend-
ance of witnesses and the production of documents for the pur-
'llntermountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 476, 486.
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pose of the trial. From the evidence in the case the trier, whether
this be judge or jury, or judge advised by a jury, finds the facts,
and by applying to these facts the rules of law governing the case,
the court reaches its conclusion. That conclusion, when duly
announced or recorded, becomes a judgment settling the rights of
the parties to the action. In some cases and within certain limits,
the court has discretion as to its judgment, known as judicial dis-
cretion. When exercising this discretion, the judge is supposed
to determine what is just in a particular case, when the established
rule of law fixes the limits of judicial action, but does not control
judicial freedom of action within those limits.
The cases are full of expressions with reference to administra-
tive bodies in which it is said that such bodies act judicially or
quasi-judicially because one or more requirements to the validity
of the action of such bodies is imposed by law, such as notice, or
hearing of the parties, or acting fairly and with sound discretion.
Nothing could be more unfortunate than this use of the term
"judicial." It is the duty of every administrative board or officer,
to exercise sound discretion, although there may be no way of
testing the question whether or not such discretion has been
exercised. In certain cases notice, in other cases opportunity for
hearing, is necessary before the administrative board or officer is
entitled to take action. None of these requirements, however, in
the least affect the administrative, as distinguished from the judi-
cial character of the action taken. It would seem almost as if
there were a confusion of thought between the words "judicious"
and "judicial," or possibly between the use of the word "judg-
ment" as applied to the exercise of the reasoning faculties, and
the technical use of the word as applied to the decision of a cause
by a judicial tribunal. Great as are the difficulties in applying
the doctrine of the separation of powers under our American con-
stitutions, no one will assert that the judicial function of govern-
ment can be exercised by any other than the judicial department of
the government. The judicial function is to determine the rights
of parties to the cause. The administrative function is to deter-
mine the respective rights of the state, or of the public, and of
those affected by the administrative action. Under the Federal
Constitution no man can be deprived of his property without due
process of law. Whether that due process must be administrative
process or judicial process, depends upon the character of the
transaction.
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The administrative function may include a portion of the legis-
lative function. It is a maxim that legislative power cannot be
delegated, but this maxim is more of a stumbling block than an
aid in dealing with actual cases. Although generalizations are
dangerous, it would be more accurate to say, in the present state
of the law, that whenever the question whether or not a particular
rule of conduct is desirable, depends upon the determination of
any complicated questions of fact in so far as the conduct of the
business of the community is concerned, the power to investigate
those questions of fact and to enact a rule of conduct for the
public benefit with relation to those facts, may be delegated by
the legislature to an administrative officer, board, or commission.2
There are innumerable commissions in this country, federal and
state, of which the Interstate Commerce Commission is the most
important, which are authorized by legislative authority to make
rules governing the conduct of business of various kinds, and the
violation of those rules when made, is often declared by legislative
authority to be a crime.
The administrative power may also include a portion of the
executive power, and the same commission may be vested with
the legislative power to enact a rule of conduct, and with the
executive power of compelling compliance with that rule.
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